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I. ABSTRACT
"While academic debates about the possibility of objective truth and
falsehood are often rarified to the point of absurdity, Rwanda
demonstrated that the question is a matter of life and death."'
The tension between universalism and cultural relativism lies at the heart
of war crimes and war crimes prosecutions. While cultural relativism
arguments should never be the basis for ignoring war crimes outside of the
West (particularly in Africa), neither should the international community adopt
a radical universalist approach that ignores the unique circumstances underlying
each war crimes prosecution. The establishment of the International Criminal
Tribunal of Rwanda (hereinafter "ICTR"), over the objection of the post-
genocide Rwandan government, probably erred on the side of universalism by
ignoring the legitimate needs of the Rwandan people. Nevertheless, the ICTR
has appropriately adopted a mild cultural relativist approach in its proceedings
by considering cultural differences when evaluating witness testimony,
interpreting the definition of certain crimes within the context of the Rwandan
experience, and considering Rwandan sentencing practices when sentencing
defendants. Future international tribunals should learn from the ICTR exper-
ience and consider cultural differences, as necessary, to do justice in the
communities they are designed to serve.
11. INTRODUCTION
The creation of several new international war crimes tribunals over the
past fifteen years raises a host of legal and policy issues concerning the way
these tribunals seek to do justice. Arguably one of the most important issues
is the role, if any, that cultural differences should play in the establishment and
operation of these tribunals. This issue is important because the long-run
legitimacy of the tribunals will depend on their acceptance by both the
communities in which they seek to do justice, as well as the larger international
community. This dual acceptance, in turn, will largely depend on the ability of
these courts to recognize and take into account cultural differences that may
affect their ability to uncover the truth, while also ensuring that people from all
backgrounds are equally protected from (or held accountable for) the crimes
under their jurisdiction.
There are easily recognizable truths on both sides of the debate. On the
one hand, if the international community has universally condemned a
1. PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT ToMoRRow WE WILL BE KILLED WrrT
OUR FAMILIES: STORES FROM RWANDA 259 (1998) [hereinafter GOuREVITCH, STORIES FROM RWANDA].
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particular crime, why should cultural differences play any role in how an
international tribunal investigates and prosecutes that crime? On the other
hand, how can international judges seek to adjudicate the guilt or innocence of
individuals from a culture that is not their own, while also attempting to
combine different legal cultures and receive evidence in a language that they do
not speak, without recognizing and taking these differences into account?
Part Il of this article explores this dilemma in general terms. First, the
article will provide a brief summary of the debate between universalism and
cultural relativism in the field of international human rights. The article will
then argue that cultural relativism issues lie at the heart of war crimes and war
crimes prosecutions. The very definition of war crimes is affected by cultural
relativism, and relativism is often a subtext in debates about whether war
crimes should be addressed by international, domestic, or hybrid courts.
Moreover, even within the context of an international criminal tribunal, there
is a need for cultural sensitivity in the way that tribunal seeks to do justice.
Part IV of this article applies these general observations to the establish-
ment and operation of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (herein-
after "ICTR" or "Tribunal"). The facts leading up to the Rwandan genocide
and the establishment of the ICTR will first be set out, with an eye towards the
role that the international community played in these events. The article will
then ask whether the establishment of the tribunal was reflective of a harmful
"one-size-fits-all" attitude in the international community, or if it was a
necessary step in order to accord justice equally in Africa as in Europe? It will
also explore select decisions of the ICTR with an eye toward whether, and how,
these decisions were influenced by real or perceived cultural distinctions
between the international judges and the persons before them, specifically
focusing on: 1) cultural factors that affect witness testimony; 2) the question
of applying the international law of genocide in the Rwandan context; and 3)
the role of culture in sentencing at the ICTR.
Part V will conclude that future international tribunals can learn a great
deal from the ICTR experience. It will argue, generally, that sensitivity to
cultural differences will assist international tribunals to be more effective in
war crimes prosecutions, but that the international community must also be
careful not to allow actual or perceived cultural differences to become an
excuse to disregard or minimize war crimes. The article then specifically
argues that international tribunals should follow the lead of the ICTR in its
willingness to recognize and take into account cultural differences as they arise.
Additionally, the article also argues that hybrid tribunals have a better chance
of striking the proper balance in this respect. Finally, the article argues that any
international or hybrid tribunal should exercise jurisdiction only when the
domestic courts are unable or unwilling to do so. The article therefore advo-
cates a mild cultural relativism approach to international war crimes prosecu-
tions.
2005]
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III. THE CULTURAL RELATIVISM DEBATE AND ITS APPLICATION TO WAR
CRIMES AND WAR CRIMES PROSECUTIONS
A. The Universalism-Cultural Relativism Debate
One of the major ongoing debates in the field of international human rights
is between the opposing views of universalism and cultural relativism. Put
most starkly, the debate is between those who believe that "[h]uman rights are,
literally, the rights that one has simply because one is a human being,"2
regardless of an individual's location, culture, or background, and those who
maintain that at least some rights vary depending on a person's culture.
According to Professor Jack Donnelly, a western political scientist, this
debate is better understood as points along a continuum rather than as a choice
between two extremes. At one end of the spectrum, radical cultural relativism
holds that culture is the only source of the validity of a human right or rule.3
On the other end of the spectrum, radical universalism holds that culture is
completely irrelevant to the validity of these rights and rules.4 Between these
two extremes lies a continuum of views ranging from strong to weak cultural
relativism.5 Strong cultural relativists would argue that culture is the principal
source of the validity of a right or rule, but would nevertheless accept the
universal validity and application of a few basic rights. Weak cultural
relativists (strong universalists) would presume the universality of most rights
and rules, but would hold that culture may also be an important source of the
validity of others.6
In addition, one element of confusion that runs through this debate is that
there are two different faces, or aspects, to cultural relativism, one generally
positive, and the other negative. On the positive side, cultural relativism
evolved largely as a reaction to the evils of colonialism. Given the fact that
"African, Asian, and Muslim (as well as Latin American) leaders and citizens
have vivid, sometimes personal, recollections of their sufferings under colonial
masters," there is an understandable sensitivity to external pressure.' In
addition, cultural relativism may be seen as a rejection of the West's "moral
imperialism," or "the rush to judge another person's flaws without revealing or
2. JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY & PRACTICE 10 (2d ed. 2003)
[hereinafter DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS].
3. Id. at 89-90.
4. Id. at 90.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 99 (arguing that this sensitivity,
though understandable, is not always justifiable).
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recognizing one's own."8 Finally, as a practical matter, human rights activists
are likely to be more effective if they ground their advocacy in local cultural
norms.
9
On the negative side, however, cultural relativism arguments are often
used as an excuse to avoid responsibility for human rights violations. Thus,
regime elites often make cultural relativism arguments in an "attempt to deflect
attention from their [own] repressive policies."'" A related problem is that,
although the community and the state are different entities, cultural relativism
arguments sometimes "assume unjustifiably an identity between government
objectives and cultural values."" "[P]articularly in states that lack democratic
institutions, the crude cultural relativists' identification of the state-and its
objectives-with the cultural values of its people remains dubious."' 2
Another slightly more subtle version of the negative face of cultural
relativism is that of the international community ignoring or excusing human
rights abuses that are occurring in a particular state. This may take the form of
well-meaning westerners, aware of the largely negative legacy of western
colonialism, failing to criticize arguments advanced by non-westerners "even
when [those arguments] are... inaccurate or morally absurd."' 3 The negative
side of cultural relativism may also take the more vicious form of neglect or
8. Berta Esperanza Hemandez-Truyol & Christy Gleason, Introduction, in MORAL IMPERIALISM:
A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 8-9 (Berta Esperanza Hemandez-Truyol ed., 2002); see also DONNELLY,
UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 99 (noting that U.S. President Clinton expressed great
indignation at the prospect of an American teenager being publicly caned in Singapore without "find[ing]
it even notable that in his own country people are being fried in the electric chair."); see also Abdullahi
Ahmed An-Na'im, Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining International Standards of Human
Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 38 (1992) ("[I]t is extremely important to be
sensitive to the dangers of cultural imperialism, whether it is a product of colonialism, a tool of international
economic exploitation and political subjugation, or simply a product of extreme ethnocentricity. Since we
would not accept others imposing their moral standards on us, we should not impose our own moral standards
on them.").
9. See, e.g., Michael McDonald, Reflections on Liberal Individualism, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CROSS-CULTURALPERSPECTIVES 155 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im ed., 1992) ("Often appeal to local shared
understandings [in denouncing practices such as torture, slavery, and genocide] has the practical advantage
of touching a government or political movement more deeply than an appeal to international standards...
[which] can be portrayed as alien and invasive, especially to collective autonomy."); see also An-Na'im,
supra note9, at 20 ("[S]ince people are more likely to observe normative propositions if they believe them
to be sanctioned by their own cultural traditions, observance of human rights standards can be improved
through the enhancement of the cultural legitimacy of those standards.").
10. DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 100.
11. Robert D. Sloane, Outrelativizing Relativism: A Liberal Defense of the Universality of
International Human Rights, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 527, 586 (2001) (arguing that "in the Rwandan
genocide of 1994, it was not culture per se, but a political elite's manipulation and exacerbation of preexisting
socio-cultural divisions within Rwandan society that caused the systematic slaughter of Tutsi").
12. Id. at 587.
13. DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 100.
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outright xenophobia, with an underlying attitude of "they've always been that
way, why should we make any effort to change things now?"' 4
The anti-relativist, or universalist, stance is also strengthened by
recognizing that relativist arguments are sometimes put forward by those
cultures who would seem to need their protective value the least. 5 For
example, in the past the United States sometimes adopted a cultural relativist
approach with regard to the juvenile death penalty, a practice widely recognized
to be in violation of customary international law.'6 Finally, Professor Donnelly
argues, with some force, that in developing countries today, rather than "the
persistence of traditional culture in the face of modem institutions ... we
usually see instead a disruptive and incomplete westernization, cultural
confusion, or the enthusiastic embrace of 'modem' practices and values. In
other words, the traditional culture advanced to justify cultural relativism far
too often no longer exists."' 7
B. Application of the Debate to War Crimes and War Crimes Prosecutions
1. Cultural Relativism and War Crimes
As in other areas of human rights, cultural relativism issues lie at the heart
of war crimes and war crimes prosecutions. With respect to the crimes them-
selves, most scholars, including relativists, seem to agree that there are at least
a small, core set of prohibitions that are universal. 8 "Few today, for example,
14. Cf GOUREVITCH, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 284 (criticizing western
commentators who, observing the serious post-colonial problems in Zaire, "took cynical solace in the
conviction that this state of affairs was about as authentic as Africa gets. Leave the natives to their own
devices, the thinking went, and-Voilh!-Zaire. It was almost as if we wanted Zaire to be the Heart of
Darkness; perhaps the notion suited our understanding of the natural order of nations."); Richard Delgado,
Rodrigo 's Roadmap: Is the Marketplace Theory for Eradicating Discrimination a BlindAlley?, 93 Nw. U.
L. REv. 215, 238-39 (1998) (discussing norm theory and social science studies that demonstrate that "[w]e
respond to persons in need according to how normal or abnormal their plight seems to us. Thus, famines in
Biafra evoke little response because we think they are normal in that part of the world.").
15. See DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 99.
16. See Patrick D. Curran, Developments: Universalism, Relativism, and Private Enforcement of
Customary International Law, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 311, 315 (2004); see also Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct.
1183, 1198 (2005) (holding recently that the juvenile death penalty is unconstitutional, in part because of the
"stark reality that the United States is the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction
to the juvenile death penalty" ).
17. Jack Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 400, 411
(1984) [hereinafter Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights].
18. See, e.g. MAKAU MUTUA, HUMAN RIGHTS: A PoLTcAL AND CULTURAL CRTQUE xi, 66
(2002); Henry J. Richardson I, Book Note, Imperatives of Culture and Race for Understanding Human
Rights Law: Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique Makau Mutua, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 511,514-15,
517(2004).
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would resort to cultural relativism to defend cultural practices that sanction
slavery, human sacrifice, or genocide."' 9 Beyond this sense of agreement as to
a small subset of crimes, however, the specifics of what acts are universally
prohibited, and when they are prohibited, are seldom articulated.2 °
In fact, one commentator, David Chuter,2' has pointed out that "there are
few, if any, war crimes ... that were not at some time regarded as permissible,
if not actually praiseworthy, in various civilizations. 22 Moreover, Chuter
argues that "international criminal justice [today] has a heavily Western, white,
Anglo-Saxon character," and that its "vocabulary and concepts are not neutral
... [but instead] are culturally specific, constructed and manipulated by a very
small number of countries, most of which have English as their native or second
language.,23  Chuter therefore concludes that international humanitarian law
does not embody universal values, but rather "is in part a form of
19. Sloane, supra notel2, at 583; see also David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity,
29 YALE J. INT'L L. 85, 126 n. 145 (2004) ("[E]ven those inclined to embrace relativist positions on human
rights never press their relativism to the point of overtly defending genocide or crimes against humanity.").
20. See, e.g., An-Na'im, supra note 9, at 21 ("[D]espite their apparent peculiarities and diversity,
human beings and societies share certain fundamental interests, concerns, qualities, traits, and values that can
be identified and articulated as the framework for a common 'culture' of universal human rights. It would
be premature in this exploratory essay to attempt to identify and articulate these interests, concerns, and
so on, with certainty.") (emphasis added); Donald W. Shriver, Jr., Truth Commissions and Judicial Trials:
Complementary or Antagonistic Servants of Public Justice? 16 J.L. & RELIGION 1, 5 (2001) (arguing that
there is an "emerging international consensus on the nature of 'war crimes' and 'crimes against humanity,"'
but also noting that "[w]e are still in the midst of an international struggle to specify these categories [and]
to give them legal definition..."); MUTUA, supra note 18 ("There are aspects of the official human rights
corpus that I think are universal. Prohibitions against genocide, slavery, and other basic abominations violate
humanity at the core. But beyondthese obvious points ofagreement, the ground becomes tricky.") (emphasis
added).
21. Chuter works for the British Ministry of Defense where he had responsibility for Balkans war
crimes issues, and support to the ICTY. See DAVID CHUTER, WAR CRIMES: CONFRONTING ATROCTY IN THE
MODERN WORLD 299 (2003).
22. Id. at 10; see also id. at 17 ("Killings, wife-stealing (the basic story in Homer's Iliad), cattle-
rustling, and the spoiling of crops were among the staples of intergroup relationships in earlier times, and
there was no sense that any of these acts was wrong, provided it was directed at a member of the out-group.
Indeed, most heroic poetry (see Homer) praises deeds that today would be thought illegal as well as
immoral.").
23. Id. at 94. Chuter specifically argues that international humanitarian norms reflect western
biases in their focus on individual guilt, imputation of command responsibility, and demand that soldiers
disobey unlawful orders. Id. at 96-97; see also CHUTER, supra note 22, at 95 ("[n]one of the major players
in the international humanitarian law game can dictate to others from a position of complete moral
superiority: all have done things comparable to some of the atrocities of Rwanda and Yugoslavia in modem
times, or they have excused similar behavior on the part of their allies. Likewise, all have blocked, or
attempted to block, investigations by international authorities into their own conduct more recently.").
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neocolonialism, in the sense that it gives the West practical leverage to achieve
political objectives such as the replacement of rulers or regimes. 2 a
Even the term war crimes is problematic. In this paper, the term generally
is used to refer to all of the crimes that fall under the jurisdiction of
international criminal tribunals, including war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and genocide. As such, it is useful shorthand, but it can also be confusing and
deceptive, and inevitably means different things in different contexts. In fact,
"each successive international court has tended to define the categories of war
crimes and crimes against humanity with new components or variations. .26
Moreover, the crimes that fall under this broad umbrella are international
crimes only because of the context in which they take place. In other words,
rape is rape, and murder is murder, but sometimes they are international as well
as domestic crimes and sometimes not. In general, it depends on whether they
take place during an armed conflict or in a situation where the violence is
"widespread and systematic" in nature-all inquiries that are somewhat
subjective.27 Finally, within the context of an armed conflict, it is typically the
character of the victim as a civilian or other non-combatant that makes a certain
act a crime, and there is often a degree of subjectivity in the definitions of
combatants and non-combatants.28
24. Id. at 95.
25. Id at 3 ("[T]he expression war crimes... needs to be used with great care. Neither the [ICTY]
nor the [ICTRI tribunals punish war crimes--they punish serious violations of international humanitarian law.
Confusingly, the Statute of the [ICC] does refer to war crimes, but in a context that is describing what was
called Violations of the Laws or Customs of War or Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions in the past.
It is a mistake to assume that war crimes are a conceptual category all their own.").
26. Patricia M. Wald, Reflections on Judging: At Home andAbroad, 7 U. PA. J. CoNsT. L. 219,235
(2004).
27. See, e.g., CHUTER, supra note 22, at 77-78 ("violations of the laws or customs of war, as well
as grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, require an armed conflict of some kind if they are to be
charged.... [The ICTY's] statute requires it to prove the existence of an armed conflict first before crimes
against humanity can be charged. (This stipulation is not found in the statute for the [ICTR] or in the ICC
Statute.)"); id. at 214-15 (the requirement of an armed conflict "has been dropped in the ICC Statute... [b]ut
the other requirement for the proof of crimes against humanity is that the atrocities should be 'widespread
and systematic,' which is to say that random atrocities, even conduced on a large scale and very brutally,
would not qualify unless there were an underlying plan of some kind."); see also Richard H. Pildes, Conflicts
Between American and European Views of Law: The Dark Side of Legalism, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 145, 160
(2003) ("[J]udging individual acts of criminal responsibility always presupposes some normative context, but
in many cases involving alleged war crimes, it is that very context that is the subject of dispute. As soon as
the law tries to assess that larger historical and political context, the law moves into areas of indeterminacy
and political conflict.").
28. See e.g., CHuTER, supra note 22, at 80 ("[a]ny troops sent into Rwanda in 1994 to 'stop the
genocide' would have found themselves firing on women and children, who made up a substantial proportion
of the Hutu killers.").
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Thus several levels of contextual nuance surround the definition of war
crimes, all of which will be impacted by the cultural viewpoints of, inter alia,
the victims, perpetrators, judges, and others who create and interpret
international humanitarian law. It is, therefore, unsurprising that cultural
relativism arguments also play a large role in determining the appropriate
response to war crimes when they occur, particularly the response by the
international community.
2. Cultural Relativism and Responses to War Crimes
Since the end of the Cold War, the international community, and
particularly the United Nations (hereinafter "U.N."), has begun to respond more
and more often to the occurrence of war crimes throughout the world. In many
cases, that international response has taken the form of the establishment of an
international legal tribunal. First, in 1993 the U.N. Security Council created the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (hereinafter
"ICTY") in response to atrocities in the Balkans during the various conflicts in
that region.29 Then in 1994, the Security Council created the ICTR in response
to the Rwandan genocide of that same year.3" In addition, several hybrid courts,
combining national and international judges and law, have also been established
or discussed-most notably in Sierra Leone, Kosovo, East Timor, and
Cambodia.3 Finally, the long-awaited International Criminal Court (hereinafter
"ICC"), the first ever permanent, treaty-based international criminal court, was
established in July 1998, and the Rome Statute governing the jurisdiction and
functioning of the court entered into force in July 2002.32
29. See S.C. Res. 808, 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993) (deciding in principle to
establish the tribunal); S.C. Res. 827, 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (adopting the Statute of the
tribunal); see also VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
RWANDA vol. 1, at 30-31 (1998); Ivana Nizich, International Tribunals and Their Ability to Provide
Adequate Justice: Lessons from the Yugoslav Tribunal, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 353, 354 (2001).
30. See S.C. Res. 955, 11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); see also MORRIS & SCHARF,
supra note29, at 72; Nizich, supra note29, at 354.
31. See, e.g., Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT'LL. 295,296-300
(2003); Laura A. Dickinson, The Relationship Between Hybrid Courts and International Courts: The Case
ofKosovo, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1059, 1070-71 (2003); Nsongurua J. Udombana, Globalization of Justice
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone's War Crimes, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 55 (2003); Patricia M. Wald,
Accountability for War Crimes: What Roles for National, International and Hybrid Tribunals?, 98 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 192 (2004) [hereinafter Wald, Accountability for War Crimes].
32. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 1, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter Rome Statute]; see also International Criminal Court, About the Court (2005), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/about.htmil.
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Yet if "[lI]aw is a form of cultural expression and is not readily transplant-
able from one culture to another . . . ,"" then the creation of international
criminal tribunals will necessarily have implications for the cultural relativism
debate. The concept of universal jurisdiction over war crimes is largely
accepted and "there is a remarkable degree of consensus among international
lawyers in favor of international criminal accountability for mass murderers,
rapists, and torturers."34 There is also, however, a healthy body of scholarship
that argues that purely outsider prosecution is a flawed response to war crimes.
For example, in critiquing the international community's response to the
Rwandan genocide, including the establishment of the ICTR, Professor Jose
Alvarez has argued that "the international community needs to be responsive
to the idiosyncratic conditions that gave rise to massive violations of human
rights as well as to the conditions prevailing in those societies in the immediate
wake of atrocities. '35  Professor Alvarez asserts that his critique "is not
premised on cultural relativism,"36 however, he does admit that there may be
"idiosyncratic cultural or historical reasons why Rwandans or other groups may
resist solutions designed or imposed by the international community," and he
agrees that some of those reasons are suggested by his analysis."
Similarly, in an analysis of the effectiveness of both the ICTR and the
ICTY, Ivana Nizich, a former intelligence analyst and research officer for the
ICTY, has opined that "[t]he international community cannot have an elitist,
paternalistic attitude toward [war] crimes and toward the victims of these
crimes, i.e., viewing local participation as inherently biased, tribal,
inexperienced, and inept., 3' Nizich also argues that "hybrid attempt[s] to fuse
international and national participation in adjudicating war crimes may, in some
cases, be preferable [to] the 'elitist' models (i.e., the ICTY and ICTR)."39
Again, though not specifically using the language of cultural relativism, the
subtext to this argument is that the hybrid tribunals will better understand and
reflect cultural values and be less prone to the moral imperialism dangers of a
radical universalist approach.
33. MARYANNGLENDON, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADmONS INANUTSHELL 10 (1982). Seealso
Kristina D. Rutledge, Note, "Spoiling Everything "-But for Whom? Rules of Evidence and International
Criminal Proceedings, 16 REGENT U. L. REv. 151 (2004).
34. Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L L.
365,366(1999).
35. Id. at 370 (emphasis added); see discussion infra Part IV (exploring the Rwandan situation and
the ICTR).
36. Alvarez, supra note 34, at 369.
37. Id.
38. Nizich, supra note 29, at 364.
39. Id. at 363; see also discussion infra Part V (returning to the advantages of hybrid tribunals).
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Finally, Professor Mark Drumbl has argued that "although all genocides
are among the most serious crimes of concern to the international community
as a whole," nevertheless, "each genocide is unique ... [and] the modalities of
securing accountability and encouraging healing should vary in each individual
case."4 Professor Drumbl thus argues that policy responses to war crimes
should be based on a "contextual approach" rather than a "deontological
approach . . . [that] posits that trials of selected individuals (preferably
undertaken at the international level) constitute the favored and often exclusive
remedy to respond to all situations of genocide and crimes against humanity.""'
Although he hesitates to specifically invoke the language of cultural
relativism,42 Professor Drumbl clearly embraces at least some aspects of the
theory, arguing that "[p]rocesses based on local culture and regional practice
may create a greater sense of familiarity among victims than the potentially
alienating procedure of trials."' 3 Thus the subtext of cultural relativism is
present, and should be recognized, in this and other debates about the relative
value of international versus domestic responses to war crimes.
3. Cultural Relativism Within International War Crimes Prosecutions
As this discussion illustrates, the response to war crimes that reflects the
most universalist approach is that of an international war crimes tribunal such
as the ICTY or ICTR. Nonetheless, even given a decision to address war
crimes through the use of an international prosecutorial body, there may still be
room for cultural sensitivity in how that body goes about doing justice.
Of course one could argue that the philosophy underlying international war
crimes prosecutions is diametrically opposed to the idea of cultural relativism.
40. Mark Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1221, 1224-1225 (2000) (quoting Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Preamble, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1999)) [hereinafter Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide]; see also Mark Drumbl,
Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass Atrocity, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 539,
548 (2005) ("[I]nterpretations of justice are often multi-layered and, for many people, take root in national
and local contexts.") [hereinafter Drumbi, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment].
41. Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide, supra note 41, at 1228.
42. See, e.g., Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment, supra note41, at 602
("Cultural relativism should not impede the establishment of a system-wide norm that holds accountable those
individuals who perpetrate acts of great wickedness. There is no culture that views the infliction of such acts
as tolerable.").
43. Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide, supra note 41, at 1265; see also Drumbl, Collective
Violence andIndividual Punishment, supra note 41, at 548-49, 610 ("[A]t a minimum, some space should
be retained in this accountability process for alternative (and perhaps competing) mechanisms, such as those
that draw from local custom, national practices, or indigenous legal process .... I propose . . . that
international criminal law and punishment contemplate communitarian underpinnings, in which international
norms become sedimentary integrated into communities in a manner that takes into account cultural needs
instead of imposing cultural values.").
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For example, Justice Richard Goldstone, the former Chief Prosecutor for the
ICTY and ICTR, has called cultural relativism "a dangerous trend" and has
argued that it should play no role in war crimes prosecutions." Indeed, we
would be appalled if an international war crimes tribunal judged the architect
of a genocide in Africa differently from the architect of a genocide in Europe
on the basis that the African defendant's actions reflected a part of his culture
with which the international community should not interfere.
Yet, at the same time, culture, and cultural differences, have been and will
continue to be an undeniable fact of life for all parties involved with
international tribunals. International tribunals typically consist of legal officers
(judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and staff) who come from different
cultures than the defendant and/or victims.4" As Judge Patricia Wald has noted
with respect to the ICTY,
[The ICTY] tries suspects in a country to which they have no ties and
sentences them to prison in other foreign countries. To many
internationalists this may reflect a triumph, but there are also voices
urging caution.... Our judicial systems, with their peculiar rights and
remedies, are products and reflections of our unique political and
cultural notions.'
If international legal officers refuse to acknowledge this reality, and
instead simplyjudge the witnesses, facts, and defendant's behavior solely based
on their own cultural norms, it is less likely that justice will result. We would,
therefore, want these judges to acknowledge and consider cultural differences
as they proceed.
Thus one could accept the universal validity and application of certain war
crimes, but nonetheless see a role for cultural sensitivity in how an international
war crimes tribunal operates. To return to Professor Donnelly's thesis, cultural
relativism arguments can apply to either the substance of human rights, the
interpretation of particular rights, and/or the form in which those rights are
implemented.47 One could, for example, advocate a universalist position with
44. Justice Richard Goldstone, Symposium: Prosecuting International Crimes: An Inside View,
7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 11 (1997).
45. See, e.g., Drumbl, Punishment, Posigenocide, supra note 41, at 1259 (Professor Drumbi notes
that the ICTR prosecutions are "held in Tanzania, . . . where the language of the trial may not be
understandable to all Rwandans, ... [and] where the trials may be encumbered by foreign (and seemingly
technical) procedures."); see discussion infra Part IV (returning to a discussion of the specific impact that
cultural or language differences have had at the ICTR).
46. Patricia M. Wald, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Comes of
Age: Some Observations on Day-to-Day Dilemma ofan International Court, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY 87,
117 (2001) [hereinafter Wald, The International Criminal Tribunal].
47. See DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 90, 96-98.
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respect to a substantive list of human rights (e.g., protection against genocide),
but also allow culture-based deviations from international norms at the level of
interpretation (e.g., how genocide is defined in a particular situation) or at the
level of form and implementation (e.g., how a tribunal goes about investigating
and prosecuting an alleged genocide).
IV. CULTURAL RELATIVISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR RWANDA
With these general observations in mind, it will be helpful at this point to
apply them to a specific case study. The ICTR is an ideal subject for this study
because several aspects of the cultural relativism debate have resonated
throughout the Rwandan experience. Moreover, the Tribunal has considered
cultural differences in the course of fulfilling its mandate, thus illustrating the
importance of these issues even when operating within a universalist
framework.
A. History of the Rwandan Genocide and the Establishment of the ICTR
1. Rwandan History Through 1994
The history leading up to the Rwandan genocide is well documented
elsewhere.4 8 However, a brief recitation of the relevant facts here-with special
emphasis on the role that the international community played in these
events-will assist us in evaluating the relevance of cultural relativism to the
establishment and work of the ICTR.
On April 6, 1994, the Rwandan President, Juvdnal Habyarimana, was
killed when his plane was shot down by a surface-to-air missile.49 This incident
sparked the widespread and systematic murder of between 500,000 and
1,000,000 civilians-mostly Tutsis-throughout the country. When the
violence subsided, more than seventy-five percent of Rwandan's ethnic Tutsi
population had been slaughtered." The scale of the violence was
unprecedented; the murders occurred at almost three times the rate of the killing
of Jews during the Holocaust.52 Yet this genocide was not a spontaneous
48. See generally GOUREVITCH, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note2; MORRIS & SCHARF, supra
note29, at 47; GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE (1995).
49. See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 47.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Philip Gourevitch, After the Genocide, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 18, 1995, at 78; Daphna
Shraga & Ralph Zacklin, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 7 EUl. J. INT'L L. 501, 502
(1996).
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uprising, nor the inevitable result of ancient tribal warfare. It was carefully
planned, and, most agree, fully preventable by the international community.53
Rwanda is composed primarily of two ethnic groups: the Hutu majority
and the Tutsi minority.54 Yet these two groups historically "spoke the same
language, followed the same religion, intermarried, and lived intermingled,
without territorial distinctions... sharing the same social and political culture
in small chiefdoms."" In fact, because of the great degree of intermixing
throughout the years, ethnographers and historians question whether the Tutsi
and Hutu are in fact distinct ethnic groups.56 Rather, the main historic
distinction between the two groups was economic: "Hutus were cultivators and
Tutsis were herdsmen."" Because being a herdsman was a more prosperous
vocation, the minority Tutsi eventually emerged as an aristocratic elite;
however, the lines between the two groups remained porous.5"
Nevertheless, when European colonizers arrived in Rwanda at the end of
the nineteenth century, they quickly seized on real or perceived differences
between the two groups in order to further their own brand of "race science."59
As Phillip Gourevitch describes it in his history of the Rwandan genocide:
[W]hen the Europeans arrived in Rwanda at the end of the nineteenth
century, they formed a picture of a stately race of warrior kings,
surrounded by herds of long-homed cattle and a subordinate race of
short, dark peasants, hoeing tubers and picking bananas. The white
53. See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 48; but see CHUTER, supra note22, at 123-24
(criticizing the post hoc calls for intervention in Rwanda as unrealistic).
54. See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 48. A third ethnic group, the Twa, comprise
approximately two percent of the Rwandan population. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n
on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, 1 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/61
(Jan. 20, 1997) (prepared by Rdne Degni-Sdgui).
55. GOUREVITCH, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 47. Although the Tutsis are generally
described as tall and lanky, with aquiline noses and longer jawbones, and the Hutus as stocky, dark-skinned,
and round-faced, "[n]ature presents countless exceptions." Id. at 50. Moreover, intermarriage was common,
and "through marriage and clientage, Hutus could become hereditary Tutsis, and Tutsis could become
hereditary Hutus." Id. at 47; see also MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 48-49.
56. See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 49. See also GOUREVITCH, STORIES FRoM RWANDA,
supra note 2, at 48 (stating that "ethnographers and historians have lately come to agree that Hums and Tutsis
cannot properly be called distinct ethnic groups.").
57. GouREviTct-, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 48; see also MORRIS & SCHARF, supra
note 29, at 49.
58. GouREVITcH, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 48; see also MORRIs & SCHARF, supra
note 29, at 49.
59. GouREvrlC, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 50; see also MORRIS & SCHARF, supra
note 29, at 49.
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men assumed that this was the tradition of the place, and they thought
it a natural arrangement.'W
Thus to conform reality to their vision of it, the colonizers encouraged and
deepened the divide between the two groups. The Germans, and then the
Belgians set up a policy of indirect colonial rule, with the Tutsis serving as
feudal lords on the Europeans' behalf.6 The Belgians also furthered the
division of Hutu and Tutsi by "conduct[ing] a census for the purpose of issuing
identity cards which labeled every Rwandan as a Hutu, a Tutsi, or a Twa." '62 A
person's classification was based on patrilineal lineage, and membership in a
particular group became increasingly rigid.63
Naturally, the majority Hutu population resented the assumption of Tutsi
superiority and the imposition of Tutsi rule by the Europeans." After World
War H, as independence movements spread throughout Africa, the Belgians
began to sympathize with the Hutus desire for self-determination.65 The Hutus
therefore seized power in Rwanda in 1959," and the first wave of systematic
political violence between Hutus and Tutsis followed. During the next few
years, over 100,000 Tutsis fled the country in the face of mass killings.67
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Rwanda was a dictatorship ruled by the
French-supported President Habyarimana, and France brought the country
within its "neocolonial sphere in Francophone Africa." ' During this same time
period, the exiled Tutsis attempted several times to invade Rwanda and
overthrow the government. After each unsuccessful attempt, Tutsis in Rwanda
would be massacred by the thousands.69
In 1990, the largely Tutsi refugee army known as the Rwandan Patriotic
Front (hereinafter "RPF") attacked again, and France responded by sending
arms to Rwanda and providing a contingent of troops to fight with the Rwandan
army.7" In late 1992, the fighting between the Rwandan army and the RPF
60. GOUREVrrCH, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 50.
61. See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 49; see also GOuREVITCH, STORIES FROM RWANDA,
supra note 2, at 54.
62. MORRIS & ScHARF, supra note 29, at 49.
63. Id. at 49-50.
64. See GOUREVITCH, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 57-58.
65. Id. at 58.
66. Id. at 59; MORRIS & ScHARF, supra note 29, at 50.
67. See GOUREVrrCH, STORIESFROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 59; MORRIS & SCHARF,supra note
29, at 50.
68. MoRRis & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 50.
69. Id; GOUREVrTCH, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 65 ("The British philosopher, Sir
Bertrand Russell, described the scene in Rwanda in 1964 as the most horrible and systematic massacre we
have had occasion to witness since the extermination of the Jews by the Nazis.").
70. See generally GOuREVrrCH, STORIES FRoM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 88; MoRRIS & SCHARF,
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forces reached a stalemate, and the two camps began negotiating a series of
agreements that culminated in the August 1993 Arusha Aeace accords.71
"[C]rucially, throughout the peace-implementation period a United Nations
peacekeeping force would be deployed in Rwanda."72
Hutu extremists, many of whom were close to President Habyarimana,
were strongly opposed to the peace agreement, even as Hutu moderate
opposition parties gained increasing support among the Rwandan population.73
To shore up his support among the Hutus, President Habyarimana soon sought
to again unite them against a common enemy-the Tutsis.74 In 1993, a training
camp for the Hutu militia was established, providing groups of 300 Hutus at a
time with courses "on methods of mass murder and indoctrination in ethnic
hatred."" The Rwandan authorities distributed six million dollars worth of
firearms provided by France to militia members and other Habyarimana
supporters; in addition, "machetes were imported en masse from China and
stored in secret caches throughout the country."76
In early 1994, the commander of the U.N. peacekeeping force in Rwanda
(hereinafter "UNAMIR"), Major General Romeo Dallaire, sent a cable to the
U.N. Headquarters warning that the Hutu hard-liners were planning a genocidal
massacre of the Tutsis.77 In the weeks following, he made repeated requests for
reinforcements and sought authorization to use force to seize the weapons
caches, but U.N. officials, still stinging from the death of U.S. soldiers in
peacekeeping operations in Somalia, refused these requests.78
This set the stage for the mass genocide that began in April 1994. Almost
instantly after Habyarimana was assassinated, Hutu soldiers and the newly
trained militia began to hunt down and kill Tutsi civilians and moderate
supra note 29, at 50; see also GOUREVITCH, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 89 (noting that France
continued to funnel huge arms shipments into Rwanda "right through the killings in 1994 ... [ilnitially,
Belgium and Zaire also sent groups to back up [Habyarimana's forces], but the Zaireans were so given to
drinking, looting, and raping that Rwanda soon begged them to go home, and the Belgians withdrew of their
own accord.").
71. See GOUREVITCH, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 99; MoRRIs & ScHARF, supra note
29, at 50-51.
72. GOuREvircTH, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 99.
73. See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 51.
74. Id. (quoting Gourevitch, After the Genocide, supra note 53, at 86.)
75. MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 52. See also The Secretary-General, Letter Dated 9
December 1994 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, Annex 165,
Final Report ofthe Commission ofExperts EstablishedPursuant to Security Council Resolution 935 (1994),
delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1405 (Dec. 9, 1994) [hereinafter Final Report].
76. MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 52.
77. Id. at 52-53; GOUREVITCH, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 103-05.
78. See GOUREV1TcH, STORIES FROM RWANDA,supra note 2, at 105-06; MORRIS & SCHARF,supra
note 29, at 53.
[Vol. 12:1
Hutus.79 Barricades were erected on major thoroughfares, at which members
of the Hutu Presidential Guard inspected identity cards and executed those who
had a Tutsi identity card or were perceived to have Tutsi physical traits.80
Tutsis were hunted down and killed through house-to-house searches, and
Tutsis who sought refuge at churches or hotels were often surrounded by
soldiers and massacred." Hundreds of thousands of Tutsis were murdered, and
tens of thousands of Tutsi women were raped and/or sexually mutilated.82
In the meantime, Belgium withdrew from the U.N. peacekeeping force
after a contingent of ten Belgian U.N. Peacekeepers were captured, tortured,
and murdered. 3 On April 21, 1994, the U.N. Security Council passed a
resolution that ordered the retreat of all but 270 U.N. peacekeeping troops.84
The United States not only sought to avoid involvement with peacekeeping
missions but also urged others not to undertake missions that it wished to
avoid.85 When other countries began pushing for the return of U.N. troops, the
United States demanded control of the mission and then encouraged the
Security Council to delay the deployment of troops.86 By a strange coincidence,
the Rwandan government occupied a rotating seat on the Security Council at
this time.87
At the same time, French diplomats were depicting the massacre as a
"mass popular outrage" in response to the President's assassination.88 France
also encouraged the view that that the killing was an extension of the war with
the RPF, and that the RPF was either the greater offender, or that at most a two-
way genocide was taking place; "in short, that Rwandans were simply killing
each other as they were wont to do, for primordial tribal reasons, since time
immemorial."8 9 France also launched "Operation Tourquoise," which the
Security Counsel endorsed, and gave permission to use force. 90 "Operation
Turquoise" set up a safe zone in southwestern Rwanda, but many asked "safe
for whom?" 9' The operation did rescue at least 10,000 Tutsis, but thousands
more were killed in the zone under France's control.92 The Hutu government
79. See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 53.
80. Id. at 54; see also Final Report, supra note 76, 1 69.
81. See Final Report, supra note 76, fT 69-72.
82. See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 55.
83. See GOuREVITCH, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 114, 150.
84. Id. at 150.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 151.
87. See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 60.
88. GOuREVITCH, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 154.
89. Id.; see also id. at 156.
90. Id. at 155-56.
91. GOUREVITCH, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 157.
92. Id. at 158.
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even moved its radio station into the French zone and continued to broadcast
incitements to kill Tutsis.93
Nevertheless, by mid-July, the RPF had pushed its way to the capital, and
hundreds of thousands of Hutus had fled into Southwest Rwanda and Zaire
(now the Democratic Republic of the Congo). 94 On July 18, the Hutu extremist
government fled the country and the RPF established a new coalition
government with the surviving members of the anti-Hutu power opposition
parties.95 Thus the genocide ended, but Rwanda was left with hundreds of
thousands dead and wounded, and hundreds of thousands of murderers and
accomplices.
2. After the Genocide: The International Community's Response
The international community had failed to prevent or stop the genocide,
but it nevertheless quickly turned to the question of what it might do to help
bring the perpetrators to justice.96 The Rwandan penal system had been
completely decimated, 97 and the new government-which now occupied the
Rwandan seat on the Security Council-began pressing for a war crimes
tribunal similar to the ICTY, set up the previous year.98
However, many on the Security Council were resistant to the idea of a
"costly international investigation and a tribunal which the United Nations
could ill-afford."" Such resistance was harshly criticized, and some suggested
that it smacked of racism.'°° As one commentator noted:
[H]ad the sequence of events between the Yugoslav and Rwanda
conflicts been different, it is by no means certain that a tribunal for
Rwanda would have been established. On the basis of international
93. See MORRiS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 61.
94. See GOUREVITCH, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 162; see generally id at 156
(noting those fleeing included many who had been responsible for the killings and that they "were
indiscriminately received with open arms by UN and humanitarian agencies and accommodated as refugees
in giant camps."); see also MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 60.
95. SeeGOUREVTCH, STORIEs FROM RWANDAsupra note 2, at 162; MORRIs &SCHARF, supra note
29, at 58.
96. See MORRiS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 61.
97. See Jose Alvarez, Lessons from the Akayesu Judgment, 5 ILSA J. INT'L & COmp. L. 359, 369
(1999) (noting that, after the genocide, there were "sixteen lawyers left alive" in Rwanda); see also Nicole
Fritz & Alison Smith, Current Apathy for Coming Anarchy: Building the Special Court for Sierra Leone,
25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 391, 406 (2001) (noting that "the genocide in Rwanda left the judicial system
virtually destroyed-approximately ninety-five percent of the country's lawyers and judges were killed,
exiled, or imprisoned").
98. See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 62.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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responses to other situations, it has been suggested that the plight of
African victims would not generate the same outcry as the suffering
of Europeans. In other words, the Rwanda Tribunal was established
[only] because of the precedential effect of the Yugoslav Tribunal.01'
Or as the Prime Minister, delegate of the new Rwandan coalition
government, asked, "Was a war crimes court not set up in Germany? Is it
because we're Africans that a court has not been set up [for Rwanda]?"' 2
Thus, in November 1994, the Security Council established the ICTR.0 3
In a strange turn of events, however, Rwanda was the only member of the
Security Council to vote against the Resolution that created the Tribunal."°
Although it had initially requested its creation, as negotiations progressed
Rwanda objected to a number of the provisions in the Tribunal's governing
statute.'0 5 First, Rwanda objected because the ICTR would have jurisdiction
only over crimes committed during the 1994 calendar year," which would
prevent the ICTR from fully investigating the activities that led up to the
genocide.'0 7 Second, Rwanda objected that the ICTR would be understaffed
and underfunded, with only a handful ofjudges and with the appellate body and
chief prosecutor to be split between the ICTR and the ICTY.' Third, Rwanda
objected to the fact that the seat of the court would be in Tanzania rather than
Rwanda, which would make it more difficult for the Rwandan people to follow
the court's proceedings."°
Finally, Rwanda objected to the fact that the Tribunal's statute prohibits
the imposition of the death penalty."0 This objection was tied to the fact that
the ICTR was never expected to try more than a handful of defendants, and that
it would focus on the regime elites who had the greatest role in organizing and
executing and the genocidal plan."' Because the Rwandan Penal Code
provides for the death penalty, "[t]hose most responsible for the killings" would
not face the death penalty, while lower-level perpetrators tried in the Rwandan
101. Payam Akhavan, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and
Pragmatics of Punishment, 90 AM. J. INTL L. 501 (1996).
102. MoRRIs & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 62.
103. Id. at 72; see generally Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, Nov. 8, 1994, 33
LL.M. 1598.
104. See MORRIs & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 72.
105. See Madeline H. Morris, Justice in the Wake of Genocide, in WAR CRiMEs: THE LEGACY OF
NUREMBERG 213 (Belinda Cooper ed., 1999) [hereinafter Morris, Justice in the Wake of Genocide].
106. See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 105, at art. 7.
107. See Morris, Justice in the Wake of Genocide, supra note 107, at 213.
108. Id at 214.
109. See MoRRIs & ScHARF, supra note 29, at 68.
110. See Morris, Justice in the Wake of Genocide, supra note 109, at 214.
111. See CHUTER, supra note 22, at 221.
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courts might be executed.112 Similarly, Rwanda argued that the prison terms for
those convicted at the Tribunal should be served in Rwanda, and "not in some
posh facility in Europe.""'
These specific disputes also reflected Rwanda's broader frustration with
the international community. Many felt that Rwanda needed international
assistance to fit its unique situation, but instead the international community
applied a cookie-cutter approach by establishing a tribunal that was "essentially
a weaker, more impoverished replica" of the ICTY." 4 Moreover, whereas at
the time of the establishment of the ICTY there was little reason to expect
serious local prosecutions of war crimes perpetrators, the situation with Rwanda
was different--"local authorities were willing to prosecute and could have used
extensive international assistance to make such efforts more credible.""' 5
Instead, international resources that could have gone to rebuild the shattered
Rwandan justice system were diverted to the ICTR." 6 Thus some have argued
that the existence of the ICTR is more a reflection of internationalist priorities
than a genuine response to the needs of the Rwandan victims." 7
B. Cultural Relativism and the Rwandan Experience
This history-both of the Rwandan genocide and of the establishment of
the ICTR-illustrates several of the issues in the universalist/cultural relativist
debate discussed supra. In fact, both universalists and cultural relativists can
find support for their positions in these facts.
1. The Universalist Response
First, a universalist could point out that certain real or perceived elements
of Rwandan culture appear to have contributed to the genocide. For example,
Rwandans and non-Rwandans alike often speak of the culture of impunity that
112. Id.
113. MORRIS & SCHARF,supra note 29, at 68 ("[P]risons that house convicted criminals indicted by
the ad hoc tribunals have to meet minimum U.N. standards, and these standards are often higher than average
Africans would expect in their private homes."); see also CHtrER, supra note 22, at 221; Drumbl, Collective
Violence and Individual Punishment, supra note 41, at 579 (noting also that many victims as well as
perpetrators of the violence in Rwanda are HIV-positive, and that prisoners of the ICTR have access to
medical care that is not available to most of the victims).
114. Alvarez, supra note 99, at 369-70; GouREV1TCH, STORIES FROMRWANDA, supra note 2, sit 252
(quoting one Rwandan diplomat as saying that "We asked for help to catch these people who ran away and
to try them properly in our own courts... [but instead] the Security Council just started writing 'Rwanda'
under the name 'Yugoslovia' everywhere.").
115. Alvarez, supra note 99, at 370.
116. Id. (stating that resources "reaching between $40 and $50 million a year" were going to the
international tribunal).
117. ld.at370.
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prevailed prior to 1994.1"8 Although this is more in the nature of
rhetoric-meaning simply that perpetrators of previous abuses had gone
unpunished-than an assertion of an actual cultural value, the use of the word
is nonetheless telling. Moreover, there does appear to have been a cultural
norm that encouraged inter-ethnic violence in Rwanda, especially when that
violence was orchestrated and ordered by community leaders." 9 This aspect of
Rwandan society is sometimes referred to as a culture of obedience: 20
[T]here had always been a strong tradition of unquestioning
obedience to authority in the pre-colonial kingdom of Rwanda. This
tradition was of course reinforced by both the German and the
Belgian colonial administrations. And since independence the
country has lived under a well-organized tightly-controlled state.
When the highest authorities in that state told you to do something
you did it, even if it included killing.'2'
To the extent that these can be considered cultural values or traits, a
universalist approach would argue, correctly, that these traits are not worthy of
protection.
In addition, as illustrated by the history of Rwanda discussed supra,
Rwanda is an example of "disruptive and incomplete westernization [and]
cultural confusion.. . " and thus cultural relativism arguments have less force
when applied to modem Rwandan culture. 122 Indeed, the supposedly ancient
tribal conflicts between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda are directly rooted in the
legacy of colonialism, and until "1959 there had never been systematic political
violence recorded between Hutus and Tutsis-anywhere."'2 3 As one scholar
has pointed out, the "simplistic 'tribal war thesis' is often a reflection of
ethnocentrism, if not an expedient absolution from apathy in the face of
immense human suffering."'' 24 This version of ethnocentrism thus reflects one
118. See, e.g., Payam Akhavan, Justice andReconciliation in the Great Lakes Region ofAfrica: The
Contribution of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 325, 333
(1997).
119. See GOUREVITCH, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 123 ("During the genocide, the
work of the killers was not regarded as a crime in Rwanda; it was effectively the law of the land, and every
citizen was responsible for its administration.").
120. See Akhavan, supra note 120, at 335.
121. PRUNIER, supra note 49, at 245; see also Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual
Punishment, supra note 41, at 568 ("[Un certain circumstances, those who commit extraordinary international
crimes are the ones conforming to social norms whereas those who refuse to commit the crimes choose to act
deviantly.").
122. Jack Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights, supra note 18.
123. GOUREVITCH, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 59.
124. Akhavan, supra note 122, at 329.
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aspect of the negative face of cultural relativism-the outsider dismissing
human rights abuses on the grounds that it is just their culture, so there's
nothing that we can do about it.
Similarly, with respect to the establishment of the ICTR, the universalism
argument directs our attention to the admonitions by Rwandans and others that
genocide in Africa is just as worthy of international adjudication as is genocide
in Europe. Indeed, we must avoid cultural relativism arguments in cases where
such arguments are nothing more than a way for the international
community-particularly the West-to avoid responding to horrors that take
place in cultures that do not more closely resemble our own.
2. The Cultural Relativist Response
The history of Rwanda and the establishment of the ICTR provides support
for cultural relativism arguments as well. Cultural relativism is, at least in part,
a response to colonialism and the harm that comes from outside (particularly
western) influences in another culture. Given the fact that the Tutsi/Hutu
distinction and ultimate conflict was largely furthered through western
influence-based on then-current notions of race and ethnicity-Rwanda would
be justified in resisting further impositions of western values, even if those
values are now couched in terms of assistance rather than conquest. Moreover,
given the failure of the international community to prevent or stop the genocide,
as well as the cooperation of some western states with the regime that
perpetrated the genocide, Rwanda would be correct to greet any new offer of
western help with skepticism.
In addition, elements of moral imperialism (the "negative face" of
universalism) can be found in the Security Council's decision to create the
ICTR in spite of the objections by the post-genocide Rwandan government.
This decision may reflect the perception "that the Rwandan judiciary was
incapable of reaching just verdicts," and that "any trials that Rwanda might
hold ... [would be] beneath international standards."'25 This perception is
furthered by the fact that the ICTR has primary jurisdiction in any case that fits
under its mandate, meaning that it may require Rwandan (or other) domestic
courts to relinquish any defendant falling under its mandate to itsjurisdiction.'26
While this does not necessarily reflect insensitivity to specific Rwandan
cultural values, it does imply that the international community is a better judge
of Rwandan events than are Rwandans. This is questionable, in light of the
international community's actions leading up to and during the genocide; and
125. GOUREVITCH, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 252-53.
126. See, e.g., Madeline H. Morris, Rwandan Justice and the International Criminal Court, 5 ILSA
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 351, 354 (1999) [hereinafter Morris, Rwandan Justice].
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dangerous, as it may encourage the perception of Rwanda as lawless, tribal, or
primitive (a perception that universalists would also seek to avoid).
C. The Role of Culture in ICTR Trials and Decisions
By looking at Rwanda through the lens of the universalist/cultural
relativist debate, we can see that there are truths-and dangers-in both lines
of thought. This section will now turn to the question of what role, if any,
cultural sensitivity does or should play in the operation of the Tribunal. As
demonstrated by several cases issued by the Tribunal, I believe that it has
appropriately adopted a mild cultural relativist approach in its operations, and
that it has endeavored, where appropriate, to recognize and take into account
differences in the Rwandan culture when recognition of those differences has
assisted the Tribunal to do justice.
1. Cultural and Language Factors Affecting Witness Testimony
Several ICTR decisions have noted the difficulty of receiving and inter-
preting testimony from witnesses whose culture and language is foreign to the
Tribunal judges' own. The first case to discuss this issue was The Prosecutor
v. Akayesu, in which the trial chamber found the former Bourgmestre (mayor)
of Taba guilty of genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide,
crimes against humanity, and sentenced him to life in prison. 27
In assessing the evidence against Mr. Akayesu, the trial chamber specifi-
cally considered "cultural factors which might affect an understanding of the
evidence presented."' 28 Some of these difficulties stemmed from the fact that
most of the witnesses spoke Kinyarwanda, but this was not one of the
Tribunal's official languages. For example, the trial chamber noted that there
appeared to be contradictions between the testimony of several witnesses on the
stand and earlier statements by these same witnesses given to Tribunal
investigators. 29 The trial chamber explained these inconsistencies, in part, by
noting that "the interpretation of oral testimony of witnesses from Kinyarwanda
into one of the official languages of the Tribunal [French and English] has been
a particularly great challenge due to the fact that the syntax and everyday modes
of expression in the Kinyarwanda language are complex and difficult to
translate into French or English." 3' These difficulties, the Tribunal reasoned,
127. See generally Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 638-744 (Sept.
2, 1998); Cecile E.M. Meijer, The War Crimes Research Office Presents: News from the International
Criminal Tribunal, 9 No. 3 HuM. RTS. BREF 30, 32 (2004).
128. Akayesu, 130.
129. Id. 1140.
130. Id. 145.
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affected the pre-trial interviews as well as the interpretation of in-court
testimony.'3'
The trial chamber also noted that certain Kinyarwanda terms were infused
with special meaning that could only be understood within the context of the
Rwandan culture. For example, the basic meaning of the term inyenzi is
"cockroach."' 32 However, the term had also been used to refer to the incursions
of Tutsi refugees since the 1960s,'33 and it was later used by anti-Tutsi extre-
mist media to refer to all Tutsis.'34 Similarly, the term ibyitso, which literally
means "accomplice," evolved in the early 1990s to refer to all Tutsi.'35
Moreover, taking such linguistic nuances into account may be relatively
simple compared to the additional, broader cultural factors that the Tribunal
found were also affecting witness testimony. 36 For example, the Tribunal
received expert testimony that "most Rwandans live in an oral tradition in
which facts are reported as they are perceived by the witness, often irrespective
of whether the facts were personally witnessed or recounted by someone
else.'' 137 Thus during the examination of certain witnesses, it was "at times
clarified that evidence which had been reported as an eyewitness account was
in fact a second-hand account of what was witnessed."' 38 The expert witness
explained that this was common in the Rwandan culture, but also that "the
Rwandan community was like any other and that a clear distinction could be
articulated by the witnesses between what they had heard and what they had
seen."' 39 The trial chamber therefore "made a consistent effort to ensure that
this distinction was drawn throughout the trial proceedings."'"4
The Tribunal also received expert testimony that
it is a particular feature of the Rwandan culture that people are not
always direct in answering questions, especially if the question is
131. Id. Although not mentioned by the Tribunal, Chuter also argues that "not every society expects
ordinary people to volunteer evidence unless asked," and that the investigators may not have been thorough
enough in their questioning to elicit full responses, responses which would later come out in the court room.
CHUTER, supra note 22, at 157.
132. Akayesu, 148.
133. Id. ("Throughout the 1960's incursions on Rwandan soil were carried out by some of these
refugees, who would enter and leave the country under the cover of the night, only rarely to be seen in the
morning. This activity was likened to that of cockroaches, which are rarely seen during the day but often
discovered at night, and accordingly these attackers were called Inyenzi.").
134. Id. 149.
135. Id. 150.
136. Id. 155-56.
137. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 155 (emphasis added).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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delicate. In such cases, the answers given will very often have to be
'decoded' in order to be understood correctly. This interpretation will
rely on the context, the particular speech community, the identity of
and the relation between the orator and the listener, and the subject
matter of the question."'
The trial chamber noted specific instances of this in the proceedings. For
example, several witnesses were reluctant or unwilling to state that the ordinary
meaning of the term inyenzi was cockroach, although all Rwandans know the
meaning of the word.'42 More generally, the trial chamber also attributed to
cultural constraints the "difficulty [of some witnesses] to be specific as to dates,
times, distances and locations."' 43
In light of these observations, the "Chamber did not draw any adverse
conclusions regarding the credibility of witnesses based only on their reticence
and their sometimes circuitous responses to questions.""' This is significant,
as it acknowledges that in many cultures such reticence or circuitous testimony
would affect a witness' credibility. Indeed, the judges' inclusion of this
discussion in the opinion reflects the fact that the judges themselves would-in
their home countries-likely have drawn a negative inference about these
witnesses' credibility.'4 5 However, in this case, an insistence on the type of
directness that the judges would normally associate with truthfulness might
have led them to discount truthful testimony and reach an unjust result. The
judges therefore correctly recognized that they must consider the cultural
differences between themselves and the witnesses before them in adjudicating
the case.
Similarly, in The Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, the trial chamber found
Georges Rutaganda, second vice-president of the youth wing of the
Interahamwe-the youth militia responsible for many of the killings-guilty of
genocide and crimes against humanity and sentenced him to life in prison.'4 6
The trial chamber noted that it had:
taken into consideration various social and cultural factors in
assessing the testimony of some of the witnesses. Some of these
141. Id. 156.
142. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 156.
143 Id.
144. Id.
145. The Trial Chamber consisted of Presiding Judge Laity Kama from Senegal, Judge Lennert
Aspegren from Sweden, and Navanethem Pillay from South Africa. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-
96-4-T, Sentencing Decision (Oct. 2, 1999).
146. Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3, Judgment and Sentence, 3 2, 11 (Dec. 6,1999);
see also Alexandra L. Wisotsky, News from the International Criminal Tribunals, 8 No. 3 HuM. RTS. BRIEF
18(2001).
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witnesses were farmers and people who did not have a high standard
of education, and they had difficulty in identifying and testifying to
some of the exhibits, such as photographs of various locations, maps
etc. These witnesses also experienced difficulty in testifying as to
dates, times, distances, colours and motor vehicles.'
47
The trial chamber also noted "that many of the witnesses testified in
Kinyarwanda and as such their testimonies were simultaneously translated into
French and English. As a result, the essence of the witnesses' testimonies was
at times lost.'
' 4
On appeal 149 Rutaganda argued that the trial chamber committed an error
of law "by improperly taking judicial notice of social and cultural factors."' 5
Rutaganda argued that "social and cultural factors are not 'matters of common
knowledge' in respect of which judicial notice should be taken" under the ICTR
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and that the judges "made generalizations
that were not corroborated by evidence or, especially, by expert opinion."'' 5'
Thus, the defendant argued, "facts that were noted as being matters of common
knowledge were in reality only matters of personal knowledge and stereotypes
that the various members of the trial chamber may have had on the Rwandan
people."'52 Rutaganda also criticized the trial chamber for applying the factors
in a general way, without indicating the specific witnesses to which they
applied.'53
The appeals chamber rejected the defendant's argument. It held that the
steps taken by the trial chamber could not be properly characterized as "judicial
notice, the underlying purpose of which is to dispense with future proof of
officially recorded facts that are indisputable."'' 54 Instead, the appeals chamber
reasoned that
the Trial Judgment only states an observation that obviously dawned
on the Trial Chamber as it heard the evidence given before it, namely,
the fact that some of the persons heard were farmers and people who
147. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3, 23.
148. Id. For instance, Witness A testified at trial that he had four children who died in the genocide
and one who survived. Id. In contrast, in a pre-trial statement he had stated that he had three children, all
of whom had died. Id. The trial chamber concluded that this inconsistency was not material, and that it could
be attributed to "difficulties of transcription and translation" relating to the pre-trial statements. Id. Thus
the trial chamber did not draw any adverse inferences from these inconsistencies. See, e.g., id. 292.
149. See generally Rutaganda v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, Judgment (May 26, 2003).
150. Id. 12,223.
151. Id. 1223.
152. Id.
153. Id. 1223.
154. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, 225.
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were not sufficiently literate, and that this situation had repercussions
on the quality of their evidence.. .. '"
The appeals chamber also rejected the contention that the trial chamber
improperly took a general approach rather than indicating "in which cases and
to what extent, in its assessment, it applied the test based on the impact of socio
or cultural factors." '56 The appeals chamber concluded that the trial chamber
acted properly in setting out an introductory observation, and that it was not
required to "articulate every step of its reasoning for each particular finding it
makes."' 57 The appeals chamber also reasoned that the trial chamber had
provided some specificity about the witnesses to whom its general observation
applied, i.e., "farmers and people who did not have a high standard of
education....""'
The appeals chamber then used the example of Witness A, who "was born
in a rural prefecture and lived in Rwanda all his life, spoke only Kinyarwanda,
and was a mason by profession."'5 9 When asked to estimate a distance in
kilometers, the witness instead gave a distance based on his own visual assess-
ment. 60 The witness also had difficulty giving directions in terms of north/
south designations.1 6 The appeals chamber concluded that these difficulties
"must be taken into account," but that they "do not affect the testimony as a
whole or its credibility. ' 162
Thus, once again the Tribunal refused to hold the witnesses to a universal
standard of credibility, i.e., a standard that would conform more to the judge's
own cultural expectations. However, although the trial chamber probably
should not be required to name each instance in which it considered cultural
factors in evaluating testimony, it would nonetheless be better if the trial
chamber did so in most cases. Only then can the appellate division, the
defendants, the larger Rwandan community, and the international legal
community truly evaluate whether these were appropriate exercises in cultural
sensitivity, or whether at times the Tribunal may have seen cultural differences
where they did not exist.
155. Id. 1226.
156. Id. 1228.
157. Id.
158. Id. 1229.
159. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, 1 229.
160. Id. The witness stated: "I lived on the hill and the airport was located on a different hill. You
can see the hill from us, as the crow flies, from our home." Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. 1230. Interestingly, the appeals chamber did not address the issue of the inconsistency with
regard to the number of Witness A's children; see supra text accompanying note 150. Presumably, either
Rutaganda did not raise the issue on appeal, or the appeals chamber also accepted that the inconsistency was
a translation or transcription error.
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Specifically, Rwandans have an interest in ensuring that the Tribunal does
not characterize any cultural differences in such a way that they are perceived
as inferiorities. For example, it is unclear whether the lack of a witness' ability
to give directions in north-south designations is truly due to cultural differences
(e.g., this mode of direction is not used in some segments of Rwandan society)
or was due to the fact that a particular individual was not educated. In fact, the
appeals chamber appears to favor the later explanation, while also giving lip
service to the notion of true cultural differences that can affect witness
testimony.
Thus the trial chamber should endeavor in the future to be more specific
about the particular witnesses to whom it applies these standards, and in
relation to which part of their testimony. Nevertheless, the ICTR should be
commended for recognizing the cultural issues that are raised by its work, rather
than taking a radical universalist approach that could have interfered with its
ability to do justice.
2. Genocide and the Definition of "Ethnicity"
Cultural differences may also affect the application of international legal
concepts to specific fact situations. For example, the Akayesu decision
reflected the first time that an international court found an individual guilty of
genocide, but this was not a foregone conclusion as a matter of law. Article
2(2) of the ICTR's statute reflects, verbatim, the definition of genocide as
contained in the Genocide Convention.' Genocide "means any of[a series of]
acts ... committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group as such," including, inter alia, "killing
members of the group [or] causing serious bodily or mental harm to members
of the group."'"M The trial chamber found as fact that the defendant engaged in
these acts with the intent to destroy the Tutsi.' s Yet, as described supra, it is
debatable whether the Tutsis constituted a separate group, ethnic, racial, or
otherwise, at the time of the massacre.'66
Nevertheless, the trial chamber recognized that "in the context of the
period in question," the Tutsi and Hutu "were, in consonance with a distinction
made by the colonizers, considered both by the authorities and themselves as
163. See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 105, art. 2; see also Akayesu,
Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 1 494.
164. Akayesu, 1 13; see also Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 105, art.
2.
165. See Akayesu, 167-460.
166. Id. 1 122 n.56 ("[O]ne can hardly talk of ethnic groups as regards Hutu and Tutsi, given that
they share the same language and culture.").
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belonging to two distinct ethnic groups ... ,,'67 The trial chamber also noted
that "in a patrilineal society like Rwanda, the child belongs to the father's group
of origin," and that pregnant Hutu women were killed on the ground that Tutsi
men fathered the fetuses they carried. 6 Thus, because the victims were not
chosen as individuals or because they were RPF fighters, but rather due to their
membership in the Tutsi ethnic group, the trial chamber concluded that
genocide was committed "against the Tutsi as a group."' 69 The Tribunal
thereby adopted "a strikingly modem definition of [an] ethnic group that
accepts its constructed nature while acknowledging the power and potency of
ethnic self-identification."'
170
Similarly, in Rutaganda, the trial chamber stated that there were currently
no "internationally accepted precise definitions" of "the concepts of national,
ethnical, racial, and religious groups," and that therefore "[e]ach of these
concepts must be assessed in light of a particular political, social and cultural
context. 17' The court also held that, for purposes of applying the Genocide
Convention, membership in a particular group is a subjective concept-the
victim either perceives him/herself as belonging to a group and/or the per-
petrator perceives the victim as belonging to the group slated for destruction.1
72
Thus the trial chamber held that "in assessing whether a particular group may
be considered as protected from the crime of genocide, [we] will proceed on a
case-by-case basis, taking into account both the relevant evidence proffered and
the political and cultural context. ... 7' The trial chamber also agreed with the
Akayesu judgment that although the Tutsi population does not have its own
language or a culture distinct from other Rwandans, "there were a number of
objective indicators of the group as a group with a distinct identity."'' 74 These
included the identity cards that all Rwandans were required to carry, Rwandan
laws in force prior to 1994 that identified Rwandans by reference to their ethnic
group, and "customary rules ... governing the determination of ethnic group,
which followed patrilineal lines."'175 Considering both these subjective and
objective factors, the trial chamber concluded that the "identification ofpersons
as belonging to the group of Hutu or Tutsi or Twa had thus become embedded
167. Id.
168. ld. 121.
169. Id. 126.
170. Alvarez, supra note 99, at 360.
171. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3, 56.
172. Id.
173. Id. 58 (emphasis added).
174. Id. 1374.
175. Id.
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in Rwandan culture," and concluded that the Tutsi qualified as a stable and
permanent ethnic group under the Genocide Convention. 7
6
Thus in these cases the interpretation and implementation of a universal
norm-the prohibition against genocide-was informed and assisted by a
consideration of the specific cultural context in which a potential genocide
occurred. Conceivably, the Tribunal could have adopted a rigid, radical
universalist view that only ethnic groups as defined by objective western
sociologists would meet the definition under the Genocide Convention.
Instead, the Tribunal correctly recognized the fluidity of culture and context,
and did justice to the real-world experience of the Rwandan Tutsis.'7
3. Sentencing Practices
As discussed supra, the lack of a death penalty option at the ICTR was one
reason that the Rwandan government voted against the establishment of the
Tribunal. Nevertheless, there are other aspects of the ICTR sentencing
structure that are more sensitive to the Rwandan culture and judicial system.
Specifically, Article 23 of the ICTR Statute states that "[t]he penalty imposed
by the trial chamber shall be limited to imprisonment. In determining the terms
of imprisonment, the trial chamber shall have recourse to the general practice
regarding prison sentences in the courts of Rwanda."'' 8
This again reflects a form of mild cultural relativism, in this instance built
into the ICTR Statute itself. Under this provision, two people, one in Rwanda
and one in Yugoslavia, could commit the exact same act with the exact same
mens rea, and both be found guilty of the same crime. However, if the
sentencing practices in Rwanda (which presumably reflect Rwandan cultural
preferences) were harsher than those of Yugoslavia, 79 the Rwandan defendant
176. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3, 1374-77 (emphasis added); but see CHUTER, supra note
22, at 84-88 (criticizing the ICTR's finding of genocide as a political decision that ultimately weakens the
legal definition of the crime); see also id. at 87 ("[i]n the period when the Genocide Convention was drafted
... it was generally assumed that 'nations' were genetically different from each other ... [Also, at that time]
ethnic groups were supposed to be primordial entities rigidly and permanently distinguished from each other.
More recently, as the debates about ethnicity have grown more complex, it is becoming clear that it is a
variable concept, constructed often by elites for their own benefit."). Thus while Chuter argues, perhaps
correctly, that "[t]his is not... what the 'crime of crimes' was supposed to be like [in the 1940s]," he
concedes that he is describing the initial western race science conception of the crime. Id.
177. Akayesu, 557 n.130. Similarly, the ICTR held that with respect to the crime of direct and
public incitement to commit genocide, the "direct element of incitement should be viewed in the light of its
cultural and linguistic content. Id. Indeed, a particular speech may be perceived as 'direct' in one country,
and not so in another, depending on the audience.... On this subject, see above, in the findings of the
Chamber on Evidentiary Matters, the developments pertaining to the [expert] analysis of the Kinyarwanda
language..I.." Id.
178. Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 105, art. 23 (emphasis added).
179. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
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could receive a harsher sentence for the same act. This might seem unfair to the
individual defendant, but a contrary result would arguably ignore the needs of
Rwandan victims to see justice done in a way that accords with their cultural
expectations.
A specific example of the ICTR's sentencing practice helps to illustrate the
point. In The Prosecutor v. Georges Ruggiu, the accused, a Belgian journalist
who moved to Rwanda and broadcast discriminatory and threatening remarks
against the Tutsis and others on Rwandan radio, pled guilty to incitement to
commit genocide. 8° During sentencing, the Tribunal noted Article 23's
requirement that it take Rwandan sentencing practices into account.' Under
Rwandan domestic law, perpetrators of genocide or crimes against humanity are
grouped into categories. Category one offenders are those who were "among
planners, organizers, supervisors and leaders" of the genocide, persons who
"acted in positions of authority," or "[n]otorious murderers" who "distinguished
themselves" "by virtue of the zeal or excessive malice with which they
committed atrocities.' ' 2 Category two offenders are those whose acts "place
them among the perpetrators, conspirators or accomplices of intentional
homicide or of serious assault against the person causing death."'8 3 Under
Rwandan law, the mandatory sentence for persons found guilty of category one
offenses is the death penalty, and for persons in category two it is life
imprisonment.' However, persons in category two or below can have their
sentence reduced by entering a plea of guilty.8 5
The Tribunal concluded that Ruggiu would most likely fall under category
two in the Rwandan system. The trial chamber then noted that, under Rwandan
law, those who pled guilty after prosecution for a category two offense receive
twelve to fifteen years in prison. 6 The Tribunal also noted, however, that it
was not required to conform to Rwandan sentencing practice, but was merely
obliged to "take account" of that practice. 7 "[W]hile the Chamber will refer
Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), art. 24, delivered to the Security Council, Annex, Statute of the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3,1993) (containing an identical
provision to the governing statute for the ICTY requiring that in imposing sentence, that body "shall have
recourse to the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia.").
180. Prosecutor v. Riggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, Judgment and Sentence (2000); see also
Wisotsky, supra note 148.
181. See Ruggiu, 127.
182. Id. 128.
183. Id. Category three offenders are those guilty of "other serious assaults against the person," and
category four offenses are those who "committed offenses against property." Id.
184. Id. 29.
185. Id. 130.
186. Riggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I41 30.
187. Id. 31.
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as much as practicable to the sentencing provisions under the [Rwandan] law,
it will also exercise its unfettered discretion to determine sentences.... ,,8
In considering the appropriate sentence for Mr. Ruggiu, the trial chamber
noted that "[t]he accused is a European with a moderate level of education, who
is inspired by a sense ofjustice."'89 The trial chamber also stated that
[d]efence counsel submitted that the accused was indoctrinated by a
biased picture of the socio-political situation in Rwanda. The
Chamber takes into account that the accused was not sufficiently
knowledgeable to be able to make informed assessments of the
situation... [T]he accused was a person of good character imbued
with ideals before he became involved in the events in Rwanda."9
The trial chamber then sentenced Ruggiu to two twelve-year sentences, to
be served concurrently. 9 '
The trial chamber was correct to conform Mr. Ruggiu's sentence to
Rwandan sentencing practices. However, the chamber's references to Ruggiu's
European background and seeming corruption by his visits to Rwanda are
deeply troubling. This language implies that the chamber was more lenient
with the defendant on the theory that, as a European, Mr. Ruggiu is the product
of a more just culture.'92 If true, this would be a gross mistake. Perhaps this is
an example where one positive cultural relativist notion (Rwandan victims
deserve sentencing consistent with their own cultural notions of justice)
balanced a negative cultural relativist notion (Europeans are more just and less
violent than Rwandans) to arrive at a sentence that, though light, was at least
consistent with Rwanda's own sentencing practices.'93
V. LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
At first glance, there would appear to be little room for cultural relativism
with regard to war crimes. Indeed, in responding to a particular situation,
188. Id.
189. Id. 162.
190. Id. 163,67.
191. See Riggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, at Part IV.
192. The judges who issued this judgement and Sentence were Presiding Judge Navanethem Pillay
of South Africa, Judge Erik Mose of Norway, and Judge Pavel Dolenc of Slovenia; see Riggiu, Press Release,
Int'l Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, New Compositoin of Trial Chambers (June 7, 1999), available at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/PRESSREII1999/188.htrn.
193. But cf. Andrew N. Keller, Punishment for Violations of International Criminal Law: An
Analysis of Sentencing at the ICTY and ICTR, 12 IND. INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 53 (2001) (evaluating the
sentencing practices of the ICTR and ICTY and concluding that in general these bodies were not giving
enough weight to Rwandan and Yugoslav sentencing practices).
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international actors-particularly those from the West-should never ignore or
minimize these crimes simply because they occurred in a culture dissimilar to
our own. Thus claims for dissimilar treatment in war crimes prosecution on the
basis of culture should be treated with caution, particularly with regards to
Africa. The international community could easily hide its own neglect, or
regime elites could hide their abuses, behind a veil of cultural sensitivity.
Therefore, because the trend appears to be for the prosecution of war crimes by
international tribunals, these tribunals should apply to persons of all cultures
equally.
However, there is also room for caution. The establishment of the ICTR
by the U.N. Security Council probably went too far in embracing universal
values at the expense of the true needs of the Rwandan people. Specifically,
certain aspects of the Tribunal's statute appeared to contradict Rwandan notions
ofjustice. The absence of the death penalty, for example, raised the specter of
moral imperialism, especially in light of the fact that those found guilty at
Nuremberg were given the death penalty.94 Generally, the establishment of the
Tribunal over the opposition of the post-genocidal government will do very
little to further the rule of law in Rwanda or to assist in building the capacity
of the Rwandan judicial system.
As discussed supra, the ICTR has tried in its operations to strike a balance
between universalism and cultural relativism concerns. Nevertheless, the
Tribunal has not "made real contact with the populace affected by [its]
proceedings. [It is] perceived as distant and unconcerned with the effect of [its]
activities upon victims."' 95 The very fact that the Tribunal is struggling with
these difficulties should warn us against rushing to establish international
tribunals that will apply international law without prior input from or
knowledge about the affected culture. Judge Wald reached a similar conclusion
with respect to the ICTY:
My experience with the inner workings of an international court
suggests care. With careful self and public scrutiny, such courts can
responsibly perform important adjudication and accountability
functions that national courts in the thrall of leaders who are
194. See MORRiS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 5. If the United Nations strongly believes that the
imposition of the death penalty violates modem international norms of justice (or, put in cultural relativism
terms, that the death penalty is not a cultural value or is not a value worthy of international recognition), then
one possibility might have been to negotiate assistance that would have provided more long-term capacity
building for the Rwandan judicial system in exchange for the abolition of the death penalty in Rwanda's
domestic criminal law. Id. Of course, this solution would likely have met resistance from other members of
the United Nations who continue to impose the death penalty in their own domestic systems. Id.
195. Wald, Accountability for War Crimes, supra note 32, at 192.
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themselves alleged war criminals cannot. However, they should be
reserved for just such extreme situations.196
At the time the Tribunal was established, Rwanda was no longer governed
by its previous genocidal government. Of course, Rwanda did need inter-
national assistance, and badly. Moreover, the presence of international judges
and other legal personnel can have a beneficial effect on war crimes prosecu-
tions. For example, "the presence of international judges can help to a) educate
local judges on international law and minimal standards of fairness, b) create
an impression of impartiality, and c) insulate local judges to some degree
against intimidation from their own governments....,19 Thus international
involvement in these situations can be useful and should not be completely
rejected. Nonetheless, in the case of the ICTR, it would have been better to
seek a compromise such that the Tribunal would have involved more
participation by Rwandans and better consideration of Rwandan needs.
Hybrid courts, or courts which have aspects of both international and
national courts, likely reflect the best balance between universalism and cultural
relativism concerns in this respect.' 98 Hybrid models have several advantages
over pure international models. They are generally cheaper to establish and
operate, and-key to the cultural relativism debate-they are "considered to be
politically less divisive, more meaningful to victim populations, and more
effective at rebuilding local justice systems."' 99 In addition, because hybrid
courts typically consist of both domestic and foreign judges, local judges may
be able to explain relevant cultural norms to their international colleagues, thus
lessening the need for costly and time consuming expert witness testimony and
decreasing the chance of error in interpreting cultural norms.
For example, the hybrid special court for Sierra Leone is prosecuting those
who allegedly committed war crimes in that country's civil war.200 The Sierra
Leone Tribunal differs from the ICTR model in several respects:
196. Wald, The International Criminal Tribunal, supra note 47, at 117-18.
197. See Wald, Accountability for War Crimes, supra note 32, at 194.
198. See, e.g., Wald, The International Criminal Tribunal, supra note 47, at 118 ("[1] am happy to
see the newer proposed U.N. tribunals relying more on tribunals located closer to the countries involved and
composed in part, at least, ofjurists from these countries.").
199. Suzanne Katzenstein, Hybrid Tribunals: Searchingfor Justice in East Timor, 16 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 245, 246 (2003).
200. See S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000); see also Udombana, supra note
32, at 56; see generally Nancy Kaymar Stafford, A Model War Crimes Court: Sierra Leone, 10 ILSA J. INT'L
& COMI. L. 117, 120 (2003) (estimating that between 100,000 and 200,000 people died during the ten-year
civil war beginning in 199 1).
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1) It is based on a treaty between the U.N. and Sierra Leone, as
opposed to the ICTY and ICTR which were established
pursuant to the Security Council's Chapter VII powers;
2) The Special Court has the ability to consider not only violations
of international humanitarian law, but also certain crimes under
Sierra Leonean domestic law;
3) While it has primacy over domestic prosecutions in Sierra
Leone, it lacks primacy over national courts of third party states;
and
4) Most importantly for our purposes, "unlike the ICTY and ICTR;
which are composed exclusively of international judges elected
by the U.N. General Assembly and a Prosecutor selected by the
Security Council, the Special Court is ... composed of both
international and Sierra Leoneanjudges, prosecutors, and staff.
1,201
More specifically, of the three judges who sit in each trial chamber of the
special court, one is appointed by Sierra Leone and two are appointed by the
U.N. Secretary General. Of the five judges who serve in the appeals chamber,
two are appointed by the Government of Sierra Leone and three by the
Secretary General. 2 The Sierra Leone government can, but is not required to,
appoint judges from Sierra Leone. 3 The Secretary General also appoints the
prosecutor for a four-year term 2 °4 who shall be independent from any govern-
ment, but the deputy prosecutor must be a Sierra Leonean.0 5 The prosecutor
may also have other Sierra Leonean or international staff.2 6 Thus the special
court is more inclusive than the ICTR in several respects, thereby recognizing
the value of participation by those most affected by the crimes under its
jurisdiction.
201. Udombana, supra note 32, at 84; see also Stafford, supra note 202, at 126.
202. See Udombana, supra note 32, at 86; see also The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-
General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Annex art. 2, Agreement between the
United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000).
203. See Udombana, supra note 32, at 88 (noting that the Sierra Leonean government's first
appointments consisted of one Sierra Leonean judge for the trial chamber, and one Sierra Leonan judge and
one judge from the United Kingdom for the appeals chamber); see also Press Release, The Security-General,
U.N., Appointments to Sierra Leone Special Court, U.N. Doc. SG/A/8/3 AFR/444 (July 26,2002), available
at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/sga8l3.doc.htm.
204. See Udombana, supra note 32, at 90. (David Crane of the United States was appointed as the
Special Court's first Prosecutor in May 2002.).
205. Id.
206. Id.
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Another advantage of the Special Court is the fact that it is located in
Sierra Leone.2"7 There are significant advantages to having the court on site:
it gives the Court better and timelier access to witnesses and evidence, makes
site visits possible without long delays in the trials, and may make victims and
witnesses more comfortable when testifying.20 8 It can also help strengthen the
legal system in Sierra Leone, by giving the government significant involvement
in the establishment and administration of the court, as well as by leaving
behind the actual physical structure of the court-no small matter in one of the
poorest countries in the world.209 In addition, it will give the local population
greater access to the court's proceedings, and allow local journalists to provide
current updates in native languages.2"'
Of course, a purely international tribunal could also be located within the
country where the crimes occurred, so this is not an inherent advantage of
hybrid courts over the ICTY/ICTR model. Nonetheless, the location of a court
in the country of origin reflects an important improvement in terms of the
universalism/cultural relativism debate; it allows the local population to accept
the court as part of the local culture, and it helps to lessen the perception of
outsider justice and moral imperialism while still involving the international
community in the process. The inclusion of domestic crimes within the court's
mandate should also be an advantage in this respect, as these laws may reflect
local culture more directly and fully than do purely international norms.
Of course, hybrid courts are not a panacea for all of the problems inherent
in war crimes prosecutions. Because of the participation of international
judges, hybrid courts will inevitably have the same language and translation
difficulties that plague any international tribunal.21' In addition, since hybrid
courts are more likely to apply a mixture of international and national law, they
will need to interpret domestic law correctly-a task with which the ICTR has
apparently had some difficulty.2" 2 Of course, the risk of error should be
lessened by the presence of at least some judges from the affected country on
the court, but these judges may have to take extra care monitoring the work of
their international colleagues.
It could also be argued that the inclusion of local judges on hybrid courts
will make the proceedings more biased (either in favor of or against the
defendants) and thus less likely to achieve legitimacy with the local or
207. Id. at 128.
208. Id.
209. Udombana, supra note 32, at 128.
210. Id.
211. See, e.g., Tom Briody, Defending War Crimes in Africa: The Special Courtfor Sierra Leone,
CHAMPION, Jan. - Feb. 2005 at 34. Cf. CHUrER, supra, note 22, at 207, 217.
212. See, e.g., Morris, Rwandan Justice, supra note 128, at 352-53.
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international communities.' 3 Or, put in the context of the cultural relativism
debate, the inclusion of local judges could further (or be perceived as
furthering) negative aspects of the local culture. This argument might have
extra force where, as in Rwanda, local judges would almost inevitably be a
member of one of the disputing racial or ethnic groups. However, this problem
would also be inherent in any domestic tribunal, and thus the presence of
international judges on hybrid courts should reduce any perceived or real bias.
Perhaps this is also a good reason to have a majority of the judges come from
or be appointed by third countries, as is the case with the special court for
Sierra Leone.
Hybrid courts have also suffered from funding difficulties, e.g., the Sierra
Leone Special Court was to be funded by voluntary contributions, a problematic
approach that can lead to serious budget shortfalls.2"4 However, this is not a
problem inherent in the hybrid system, and the ICTR and ICTY have also had
funding struggles. Rather, it reflects that fact that any court, in order to be
successful, must be given the resources it needs to fulfill its mandate. The
funding problem does, however, reflect the fact that more needs to be done to
convince the international community of the advantages of the hybrid system.
Although it may not look as inherently international as some tribunals (and thus
the international community may be more tempted to say "it's not our con-
cern")-in reality the hybrid model reflects a wise compromise between the
international and domestic systems, and is probably a better way for the
international community to spend its money.
The existence of the ICC does not moot the issue. Although the ICC will,
undoubtedly, be an important factor in war crimes prosecutions, due to various
factors (especially the resistance of the United States to the court) it appears
unlikely that it will become the sole international body to prosecute war crimes
in the foreseeable future.21 5 Thus hybrid tribunals may have an important
213. See Stafford, supra note 202, at 140.
214. See e.g., id. at 138-39.
215. In this regard, the United States took a very positive step when it did not veto the Security
Council's referral of war crimes committed in Darfur, Sudan to the ICC. See Press Release, Security Council,
U.N. Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, U.N.
Doc. SC/8351 (Mar. 31,2005), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/SC8351 .doc.htm; see
generally S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005). However, it is unlikely that this signals
a major U.S. policy change toward the ICC. Not only has the U.S. government declared its intention never
to become a party to the ICC Statute, it has also taken various measures to weaken the court. See Letter from
John R. Bolton, Under Sec'y of State for Arms Control and Int'l Security, U.S. Dep't of State, to Gen. Kofi
Annan, Sec'y Gen., U.N. (May 6, 2002) (on file with the U.S. Dep't of State), available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm. These measures have included:
1) Pursing bilateral "Article 98" agreements-which prevent the surrender of any
American to the ICC-all over the world;
2) Enacting the American Servicemembers Protection Act, which, inter alia,
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role to play, and should be considered in any instance where the ICC can not or
does not assume jurisdiction over international crimes.
Nevertheless, the ICC will likely be a major force in the future of war
crimes punishments, and it should be aware of universalism/cultural relativism
issues as it pursues its mandate. As a pure international court, the ICC may
inherently tilt too far toward radical universalism ideas, as with the ICTR.2 16
However, because it is a treaty body, at some point the affected local govern-
ment (or the government of the defendant) will have agreed to its jurisdiction,
thus, hopefully, representing some consent by the local culture.217 In addition,
unlike the ICTR, which can require any national court to relinquish jurisdiction
over a defendant under its mandate, 18 the Rome Statute provides that cases will
be admissible only if national justice systems are "unwilling or unable
genuinely" to investigate or prosecute.219 In terms of the universalism/cultural
largely prohibits any U.S. court or agency from cooperating with the ICC and
requires the United States to cut off military assistance to ICC members who
have not signed an Article 98 agreement;
3) Enacting-as part of the 2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act-the
"Nethercutt Amendment," which prohibits peacekeeping and democracy-
building assistance to any country that is a party to the ICC but has not signed
an Article 98 Agreement; and
4) Blocking Security Council peacekeeping action until receiving assurances that
the ICC would not investigate or seek custody over peacekeepers from non-
state parties.
See American Servicemembers Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7433 (2005) (restricing U.S. accession
to the ICC); Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005, Pub.L. No. 108-447, §574, 118 Stat. 2809, 3027-28
(2004) (limiting economic support to foreign governments that are a party to the ICC); S.C. Res. 1497, 7,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1497 (Aug. 1, 2003) (delaying peacekeeping mission in Liberia until the United States
received a permanent exemption from ICC jurisdiction for non-state parties); S.C. Res. 1502, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1 502 (Aug. 26, 2003) (refusing to support a resolution condemning violence against humanitarian aid
workers in Iraq and elsewhere until references to the criminalization of these acts in the ICC Statute were
removed); Philip T. Reeker, Spokesman, U.S. Dep't of State, Daily Press Briefing (Aug. 25, 2003), available
at http://lists.state.gov/SCRIPTS/WA-USIAINFO.EXE?A2=indO3O8d&l=dosbrief&D=I &O=D&F=&S=
&P=255; Press Release, Ambassador Richard S. Williamson, Alternative Rep. to the U.N. for Special
Political
Affairs, Remarks at U.N. Headquarters on the Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (June 19, 2002) (on file
with the U.S. Mission to the U.N.), available at http://www.un.intusa/02_081.htm. (opposing the extension
of the U.N. mandate in Bosnia unless international peacekeepers were given immunity from ICC
prosecution); The American Non-Governmental Org. Coal. for the Int'l Criminal Court, Bilateral Immunity
Agreements (2002), http://www.amicc.org/usinfo/administration'-oficy-BIAs.html#recent (noting 92 Article
98 agreements signed as of July 13, 2004).
216. Note, for example, that unlike the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC is not required to take local
sentencing practices into account. See Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment, supra note
41, at 598.
217. See Rome Statute, supra note 33, art. 12.
218. See Morris, Rwandan Justice, supra note 128, at 354.
219. See Rome Statute, supra note 33, art. 17.
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relativism debate, this is an improvement, and should allow the court to avoid
many of the pitfalls that other international tribunals have encountered. Most
importantly, it gives the country affected the chance to implement justice
according to local customs and norms, yet it still gives the ICC the opportunity
to assume jurisdiction if the local efforts are nonexistent or merely sham
proceedings.
Finally, the ICC can strike the proper balance between universalism and
cultural relativism concerns by "working with local governments to get their
systems in shape rather than merely fighting off their efforts to resist ICC
jurisdiction.""22 The ICC can also work in conjunction with hybrid tribunals-
at least one scholar has proposed the establishment ofjoint initiatives between
the ICC and national or hybrid courts. 2 ' Finally, where it does assume
jurisdiction, the ICC can and should follow the lead of the ICTR in recognizing
and taking into account cultural differences when they arise.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, judges and others involved in international war crimes
prosecutions must be aware of the dangers of both radical universalism and
radical cultural relativism. They should attempt to strike a balance that will
recognize legitimate cultural differences-particularly when those differences
may make it more difficult to uncover the truth about what occurred-but
without ignoring the danger of using cultural relativism as a shield behind
which to hide atrocities. A mild cultural relativism approach is the best way to
accomplish these goals. This approach applauds the involvement of the
international community in war crimes prosecutions, regardless of the identity
of the victims. However, this approach also recognizes the value of cultural
sensitivity and encourages the international community to understand and work
with the culture of those whom it seeks to judge. The best balance can be
struck by establishing hybrid tribunals and/or by international tribunals
exercising jurisdiction only where the domestic courts are unable or unwilling
to do so. By following this approach, the international community can further
the cause of universal justice without alienating the very people it is designed
to serve.
220. Wald, Accountability for War Crimes, supra note 32, at 194.
221. See Stafford, supra note 202, at 137-38.
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